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EMINENT DOMAIN A DECADE AFTER KELO:
ARE TAKINGS TO BUILD PROFESSIONAL AND
COLLEGE SPORTS STADIUMS IN TEXAS
A VALID PUBLIC USE?
By: Lauren Trimble†
ABSTRACT
This Comment addresses the controversial Kelo v. City of New London
decision and focuses on the state of Texas’ response to Kelo through its enact-
ment of section 2206.001 of the Texas Government Code. This Comment dis-
cusses the implications of this statute in the realm of professional and college
sports stadiums in Texas. Additionally, this Comment provides a background
in the evolution of the eminent domain doctrine and prominent Supreme
Court decisions expanding an authorized entity’s eminent domain power
under a broadened definition of the entity providing a “public use.” The argu-
ments are analyzed for whether Texas college and professional stadiums pro-
vide a public use, concluding that land takings from private landowners for
the purpose of building sports stadiums constitutes a permissible public use
under the Kelo standard. Land takings to build a sports stadium likely consti-
tute a public use because it provides access to public participation, national
prominence, revenue, tax benefits, and hurricane shelter for its citizens. Fi-
nally, this Comment proposes legislative amendment to section 2206.001(c) of
the Texas Government Code that would raise the threshold for landowner’s
compensation from 100% of the fair market value to 150%—250% of the fair
market value of the property. A higher compensation would reimburse the
landowner for the equity value of the property and would help prevent poten-
tial holdouts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The stadium boom in Texas over the last three decades is a result of
private developers, city officials, and universities dreaming of eco-
nomic development and mass revenue. Professional football stadiums
such as AT&T Stadium, NRG Stadium, BBVA Compass Stadium, and
the Alamodome have all been built within the previous three de-
cades.1 Additionally, fourteen out of thirty-one college football stadi-
ums in Texas were built within the same period.2
As the home of two professional sports franchises—the Texas
Rangers and the Dallas Cowboys—the City of Arlington has built
professional stadiums under the state’s eminent domain power by first
approving the stadium projects through a majority vote of its citizens3
and second by condemning landowners’ property needed for the sta-
dium project through compensation for the fair market value
(“FMV”) of their properties.4 In 1994, the former owner of the Texas
Rangers—George W. Bush—and his partners put together land tak-
ings, which some argue “shortchanged local landowners by several
million dollars” for the value of their homes.5 Thus, private landown-
ers essentially gave up their land to the City in return for a sum of
money.6
Arlington punted on the decision of whether to build Rangers
Ballpark, giving its residents the opportunity to veto the ballpark in a
city-wide vote.7 The greatest voter attendance in the city’s history re-
sulted in a decisive “yes” by a margin of 30% more residents voting in
1. See Texas Professional & College Football Stadiums, TEXASBOB, http://texas
bob.com/stadium/index.html [https://perma.cc/6CWB-T8F4] (last visited Feb. 18,
2019).
2. Id.
3. See How George W. Bush Scored Big with the Texas Rangers, CTR. FOR PUB.





7. See Richard Greene, At Ballpark, Eminent Domain Worked As It Is Supposed
to Work, STAR-TELEGRAM (Feb. 12, 2016, 6:28 PM), http://www.star-telegram.com/
opinion/opn-columns-blogs/richard-greene/article60139506.html [https://perma.cc/Q2
VD-TBQ9].
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favor of the new ballpark.8 Not long after the citizens of Arlington
passed a half-cent sales tax increase to fund construction of Rangers
Ballpark,9 the Legislature unanimously passed the public purpose of
the ballpark.10
As a result of the deal, Arlington formed the Arlington Sports Fa-
cilities Development Authority, Inc. (“ASFDA”), which managed the
land construction project surrounding Rangers Ballpark.11 In order to
build the ballpark, the ASFDA took thirteen acres of private land that
would be utilized for parking and future development.12 Even if land-
owners did not agree to the price offered by the Rangers, the ASFDA
could take possession of the land under eminent domain laws and al-
low the price of the land to be resolved in court.13 What makes this
type of condemnation so intriguing is that the Legislature has never
allowed a Texas municipal authority to condemn private property for
the advantage of a sports organization.14
Arlington paid off its thirty-year bond on the ballpark in merely
eleven years, less than half the amount of time initially expected.15
Consequentially, in 2004 Arlington proposed another stadium project,
which would become the new home for Jerry Jones’ Dallas Cow-
boys.16 Arlington persuaded voters that because the Rangers Ballpark
debt was paid off, a large amount of sales tax would be available to
build the new football stadium.17 Primarily, it argued that tourists
“who stay in local hotels, rent cars, buy tickets to Arlington events,
and spend money at the venue, local shops, bars, and restaurants”
would pay a large amount of the sales tax.18 As a result of many
months of Arlington’s advertising, its citizens approved the increase in
“sales, hotel and motel, and car-rental taxes” in order to pay Jones’
$650 million stadium.”19
8. See id.
9. See Tom Farrey, Man Builds Ballpark, Ballpark Makes Man, ESPN (Nov. 9,
2000), http://static.espn.go.com/mlb/bush/saturday.html [https://perma.cc/Y9UN-P6J
N].
10. Greene, supra note 7.
11. See How George W. Bush Scored Big with the Texas Rangers, supra note 3.
12. See Erin A. Stanton, Home Team Advantage?: The Taking of Private Property
for Sports Stadiums, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 93, 94 (2005).
13. How George W. Bush Scored Big with the Texas Rangers, supra note 3 (Sev-
eral landowners filed lawsuits regarding the land takings and won $11 million in
settlement.).
14. Farrey, supra note 9.
15. Don Wall & Michael Nimocks, Stadium Story, COWBOYS STADIUM SCORE-
BOARD (Cowboys Stadium Working Grp., Arlington, Tex.), Jan. 2011, at 4, 8, http://
www.arlington-tx.gov/citysecretary/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2014/06/Cowboys-Fi
nal-Scoreboard-Report-01-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/6JA2-9X9S].
16. See Greene, supra note 7.
17. Wall & Nimocks, supra note 15.
18. Id.
19. Homeowner, Arlington Settle Eminent Domain Case Before Trial, ESPN (Feb.
7, 2007, 1:22 PM), http://www.espn.com/espn/wire/_/section/nfl/id/2757309 [https://per
ma.cc/A79A-UYR7].
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Arlington has benefitted greatly from its entertainment venues, in-
cluding increases in “jobs, revenues from rents, sales tax revenue and
more pay for much of the cost to provide public services and facilities
for all Arlington residents.”20 Additionally, Arlington claims that its
national publicity and job growth has made its taking of private prop-
erty for a public purpose a success. However, the question remains as
to whether our government is allowing a larger variety of takings that
should not be constitutionally permitted against citizens with funda-
mental rights to use and enjoy land.
Land takings under eminent domain laws have dramatically risen
since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of
New London expanded the government’s power to condemn land for
an economic development plan that constitutes a “public use,” rather
than providing a benefit for merely a certain group of people.21 Spe-
cifically, in the realm of sports stadiums, the issue remains muddy at
best as to whether a city’s or university’s taking of private land is be-
ing used for an actual “public use.”22 But, when a university (public or
private) and a professional sports team (with the help of a city) take
land from private landowners for the purpose of building sports stadi-
ums, the taking likely constitutes a permissible “public use” under the
Kelo standard because it provides access to public participation23, na-
tional prominence24, revenue, tax benefits25, and even hurricane shel-
ter for its citizens.26
Section I introduces the controversy of an expanded definition of
“public use” for sports stadium takings under eminent domain. Sec-
tion II will explain the evolution of the eminent domain doctrine and
the prominent Supreme Court decisions expanding the government’s
(both state and federal) power under a broadened definition of a
“public use.” Section III will highlight the controversial Kelo v. City of
New London decision and the Court’s reasoning for expanding emi-
nent domain. Section IV will discuss Texas’ response to Kelo, which
allows states to limit the definition of public use, and the enactment of
section 2206.001 of the Texas Government. In Section V this Com-
20. Greene, supra note 7.
21. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005); see infra Section III.
22. See infra Section IV.
23. David Humphrey, Jerry Jones Gave Texas More than the Cowboys. Don’t For-
get JerryWorld, STAR-TELEGRAM (Aug. 1, 2017, 8:48 AM), http://www.star-telegram
.com/sports/nfl/dallas-cowboys/article164708327.html [https://perma.cc/XNY3-4FQN].
24. See Wall & Nimrocks, supra note 15, at 3.
25. See Greene, supra note 7.
26. Travis Fedschun & Benjamin Brown, Tropical Storm Harvey Evacuees Surge
to Houston Shelters, Including Sports Arena, Religious Centers, FOX NEWS (Aug. 30,
2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/08/30/houston-shelters-including-sports-stadi
ums-mosques-swell-with-harvey-evacuees.html [https://perma.cc/5NSV-WBZ4].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR311.txt unknown Seq: 5 15-APR-19 14:47
2019] EMINENT DOMAIN A DECADE AFTER KELO 1105
ment will use case studies27 to evaluate whether college and profes-
sional stadiums within Texas provide a public use. Finally, in Section
VI this Comment will propose legislative amendment to section
2206.001(c) of the Texas Government Code that would reimburse the
landowner for the equity value of the property and prevent potential
holdouts.
II. EVOLUTION OF EMINENT DOMAIN DOCTRINE FROM THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
The history of eminent domain begins with an analysis of its roots in
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause of the Constitution, expands
with the Supreme Court’s Kelo decision, and develops with the States’
response to Kelo’s “public use” standard by enacting statutes that
limit its holding as much as possible. In 2005, the Supreme Court of
the United States controversially expanded the definition of “public
use” under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, but the doctrine of
eminent domain began as a narrow, formulaic test that restricted Con-
gress’ takings of private land.28
Eminent domain is essentially the government’s authority to take
private property away from landowners for a public use.29 Further-
more, eminent domain is a right that does not need constitutional au-
thority because it is a function of sovereignty.30 The purpose behind
the eminent domain doctrine involves building projects that will pro-
vide a public use to society and will reduce the threat of potential
holdouts on the property.31 “[W]ithout the power of eminent domain,
thin markets may make the acquisition of property prohibitively ex-
pensive, because of monopoly pricing by the sellers who ‘hold out’
. . . .”32 The surplus that the government receives as a result of emi-
nent domain projects essentially extends the benefit of public projects
more uniformly throughout society—through “general taxpayer sav-
ings rather than through large awards to a lucky few [landowners].”33
27. See infra Section V. The case studies include an analysis of whether the land
takings of Texas A&M University, Baylor University, and the Dallas Cowboys pro-
vide a public use.
28. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478-83 (2005).
29. Michael Birch, Take Some Land for the Ball Game: Sports Stadiums, Eminent
Domain, and the Public Use Debate, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 177 (2012).
30. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878).
31. Alex Hornaday, Note, Imminently Eminent: A Game Theoretic Analysis of
Takings Since Kelo v. City of New London, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1619, 1640–41
(2007).
32. See Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London:
An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 491, 534 (2006); see Hornaday, supra note 31, at 1641, n. 143.
33. John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 783, 809 (2006).
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Thus, eminent domain permits an authorized entity to compel the
trade of a land for a public use.34
When the federal government condemns land under the theory of
eminent domain, the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause explicitly lim-
its its power, stating that private land “[shall not] (1) be taken for
public use, (2) without just compensation.”35 Because of these limita-
tions, an authorized entity may only take land that provides a benefit
to the general public and just compensation to the landowners.36
When an authorized entity takes one’s private land, the owner should
receive the FMV of his or her land, not the amount calculated for a
corporation or other entity’s gain, in order to remedy his or her
losses.37 The judiciary determines whether the government’s objective
is truly a “public use,” but once the objective is within the scope of the
government’s power, then the method by which the government
achieves eminent domain remains at its discretion.38 Finally, the city
council implements the power of eminent domain, and it “must itself
officially express the intention and necessity to condemn the land in
question.”39
During the early formulation of the “public use” test in 1795, the
Supreme Court stated that the test should be extremely formulaic and
narrow because an authorized entity’s takings should only be done out
of urgency and necessity.40 However, the test broadened in the late
19th century into the 20th century to include government takings for
private parties’ uses, such as building milldams, irrigating farmland,
and constructing highway systems.41
In the late 19th century, the Supreme Court selectively incorpo-
rated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment, such that eminent domain became applicable to state
34. Hornaday, supra note 31, at 1643.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. V; United States v. 11.355 Acres of Land in Dall. Cty.,
Tex., 51 F. Supp. 752, 754 (N.D. Tex. 1943).
36. Birch, supra note 29, at 178.
37. See United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 275–81
(1943).
38. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954).
39. City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 781 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Burch
v. City of San Antonio, 518 S.W.2d 540, 545 (Tex. 1975)).
40. Adrianne Archer, Comment, Restricting Kelo: Will Redefining “Blight” in Sen-
ate Bill 7 Be the Light at the End of the Tunnel?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 795, 803 (2006).
41. Id. at 806. See also OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOV-
ERNMENT LAW 498–99 (2d ed. 2001) (stating “there has been a gradual liberalization
of the term once again, leading to some suggestion that the public-use requirement
poses little obstacle to most programs that any government would be likely to under-
take”); Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 26 (1885) (holding that the general
mills acts were a permissible governmental taking that constitutes a public use having
regard to the “public good” and the “rights of the riparian proprietors”); Fallbrook
Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 162–63 (holding that an irrigation system is a
public use because all individuals possess the same right to use the water); West River
Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1848) (holding that taking private property for
building a highway is a public use and not a benefit for a private corporation).
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governments.42 The Supreme Court stated in Kohl v. U.S.—one of the
first and most prominent eminent domain cases—that the States’ use
of eminent domain was permissible to the extent that it remains neces-
sary under the States’ constitutional powers bestowed upon them.43
Over the last half of the 20th century and into the 21st century, the
Supreme Court of the United States has refined the standard of what
constitutes a permissible taking. The Supreme Court held in Berman
v. Parker that a redevelopment plan for a blighted region in Washing-
ton, D.C., remained valid under the Takings Clause because Congress
holds the police power to determine which takings are necessary for
the public’s welfare.44 The Court reasoned that the “concept of public
welfare is broad and inclusive . . . It is within the power of the legisla-
ture to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious[,] . . . clean, well-balanced[,] and carefully pa-
trolled.”45 Because the District of Columbia Land Agency desired to
build new streets, schools, and various public resources, the court con-
sidered this redevelopment plan an acceptable condemnation for a
public use.46
Another prominent eminent domain case, Hawaii Housing Author-
ity v. Midkiff, upheld the Berman standard by further stating that the
“public use requirement is . . . coterminous with the scope of a sover-
eign’s police powers.”47 In this case, only a few families owned almost
all of Hawaii’s residential property, and essentially every resident was
required to pay rent to those families.48 The Hawaiian government
proposed a taking that would result in the government reselling the
land to the occupants so as to “correct [the] historic inequities.”49 The
court reasoned that Hawaii’s land taking system actually provided a
protection for lessees from the oligarchy of families, and the State’s
eminent domain power includes looking out for this type of public
welfare.50
Each land taking that the Supreme Court has previously held as
constitutional involves a condemnation by a public government that
provided a benefit directly to the public whether it be for developing a
blighted region or for protecting residents from an oligarchy of land-
42. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 479–80 (2005); Patricia J.
Askew, Comment, Take It or Leave It: Eminent Domain for Economic Develop-
ment—Statutes, Ordinances, & Politics, Oh My!, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 523, 528
n.35 (2006) (stating that “principles embodied in the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment have been incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment”).
43. 91 U.S. 367, 372 (1875).
44. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954); Archer, supra note 40, at 809.
45. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.
46. Id. at 34–35.
47. 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
48. See id. at 232–33; Philip Weinberg, Eminent Domain for Private Sports Stadi-
ums: Fair Ball or Foul?, 35 ENVTL. L. 311, 315 (2005).
49. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245; Weinberg, supra note 48.
50. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–42.
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owning families.51 The threshold line for determining whether takings
were used for a “public benefit” became much more blurred after the
Supreme Court decided in favor of a contentious taking in Kelo.
III. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON
The Supreme Court’s controversial decision in Kelo significantly ex-
panded the public use standard and motivated state legislatures
around the country to respond by providing more protections for
landowners’ rights.52 In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Kelo that the
City of New London’s taking of the Fort Trumball Development area
from private landowners for the purpose of economic development
constituted a “public use” under the Fifth Amendment.53
The City of New London wished to rejuvenate its downtown area
by attracting new corporations that would bring new visitors and reve-
nue to the city.54 As a result, New London created the New London
Developmental Corporation (“NLDC”) to help the city organize eco-
nomic development.55 New London attracted the Pfizer Corporation
that built its property adjacent to the homes at issue here.56 In 1998,
Pfizer declared that it would develop a global research building on the
property adjacent to the Fort Trumball area.57 After obtaining ap-
proval from the City Council and conducting development meetings
with the NLDC, the New London Development Agency took various
properties in order to build this new facility.58 But private landowners,
including Kelo, claimed that New London’s takings were outside the
scope of its authority under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.59
The private landowners argued that the number of improvements to
their land along with the right to use and enjoy their property should
render New London’s takings void.60 Petitioner Kelo made numerous
improvements to her home before the threat of eminent domain be-
came apparent, and another petitioner had lived in her home for 60
years.61 The petitioners claimed their property was not taken due to
its location in a blighted area, but rather because their land was situ-
ated in New London’s development region.62 Petitioners sought in-
51. See Weinberg, supra note 48, at 316.
52. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489-90; Askew, supra note 42, at 546.
53. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
54. Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 WL 500238, at *43 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), aff’d, 545 U.S.
469 (2005).
55. Id. at *2.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at *1–2.
59. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 475 (2005).
60. Kelo, 2002 WL 500238, at *3.
61. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475.
62. Id.
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junctive relief rather than simply accepting the sum of money offered
because they wished to remain in the homes that they loved.63
The trial court held that New London’s taking remained permissible
as a “public use,” and the intermediate court affirmed in part and re-
versed in part, holding that lands taken for an economic development
project that created “new jobs [and] increase[ed] tax and other reve-
nues” met the public use standard under the state and federal consti-
tutions.64 The Supreme Court of the United States “granted certiorari
to determine whether a city’s decision to take property for the pur-
pose of economic development satisfies the ‘public use’ requirement
of the Fifth Amendment.”65
The Court stated several principles of eminent domain that stand
under the common law.66 First, the sovereign may not take the prop-
erty of a landowner exclusively for the resolution of transferring it to
another landowner.67 Second, the State’s transferal of property for a
“public use” is a permissible taking of land, but a taking for a “private
benefit” is a constitutional violation because no legitimate govern-
mental purpose would exist.68 In other words, a state’s taking of pri-
vate land under the “mere pretext of a public purpose” in which its
true goal is a private benefit is void as well.69
The Court reasoned that the prior narrow test of “use by the pub-
lic” gradually broadened throughout the 19th century due to impracti-
calities, such as determining what percentage of the public must use
the land and at what monetary value.70 Thus, toward the end of the
19th century when the Court started to apply the Fifth Amendment to
the states, it broadened the test for a permissible taking to whether
the taking serves a “public purpose.”71 The Court intentionally pro-
posed this broad standard to give legislative bodies room to imple-
ment statutes accordingly.72 Furthermore, the Court stated that a
theme of federalism corresponds with giving state legislatures and
state courts the authorization to determine local needs.73
The Court reasoned that New London’s economic development
plan would deliver profits for the community, such as new job oppor-
tunities and tax revenue increases.74 It found that New London “is
endeavoring to coordinate a variety of commercial, residential, and
63. Kelo, 2002 WL 500238, at *1.
64. Id. at *44; Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 520 (Conn. 2004).
65. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 477 (citing Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1945)).
69. Id. at 478.
70. Id. at 479.
71. Id. at 480.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 482.
74. Id. at 483.
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recreational uses of land, with the hope that they will form a whole
greater than the sum of its parts.”75 Accordingly, the Court held that
because the New London’s plan for economic development consti-
tuted a permissible “public purpose,” the land takings met the “public
use” requirement under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.76 Thus,
the Kelo decision created a new standard that land takings must be for
a “public use,”77 and land takings meet the public use standard if they
(1) provide a public purpose, (2) grant a benefit on the public, or (3)
advance the states’ police powers.78
Perhaps as a response to her opinion in Midkiff, Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s dissent listed three prominent types of eminent domain
takings, which include the following: (1) “transfer [of] private prop-
erty to public ownership;” (2) “transfer [of] private property to private
parties;” and (3) “transfer of private property to remedy an identifi-
able public harm.”79 She argued that the majority’s holding continues
to overreach because economic development is not an area of eminent
domain under the Court’s precedent.80
IV. EMINENT DOMAIN DOCTRINE IN TEXAS
AND ITS RESPONSE TO KELO
A. Texas’ Doctrine of Eminent Domain: Pre-Kelo
A history of the Texas eminent domain law must be discussed
before engaging in an analysis of Texas’ response to the Kelo decision.
The Texas Constitution states that “[n]o person’s property shall be
taken . . . for or applied to public use without adequate compensation
being made, unless by the consent of such person.”81 The Texas Con-
stitution further lists the ways in which the state government may ex-
ert its eminent domain power, including for the public or for the
State’s ownership, use, and enjoyment.82
The authorized entity seeking condemnation usually negotiates with
the private landowner to buy the land, but if the parties cannot reach
an agreement on damages, the entity must file a condemnation peti-
tion in the county or district court.83 According to section 21.012(b) of
the Texas Property Code, the petition for condemnation requires a
description of the property and the purpose for condemnation.84 Fur-
75. Id.
76. Id. at 484.
77. Id.
78. Askew, supra note 42, at 534 (quoting 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.01[1] (3d ed. 2005)).
79. Archer, supra note 40, at 813 (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497-98 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
80. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
81. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 17.
82. Id.
83. City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 772 (Tex. 2012).
84. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.012(b) (West 2014).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR311.txt unknown Seq: 11 15-APR-19 14:47
2019] EMINENT DOMAIN A DECADE AFTER KELO 1111
ther, the judge appoints special commissioners as disinterested parties
to conduct a valuation of the land.85 Litigation may result if one of the
parties files written objections in response to the special commission-
ers’ findings with the court, and through this litigation the “con-
demner may take possession of the condemned property by paying
the damages determined by the special commissioners and executing a
bond approved by the court to secure payment of potential additional
costs that could be awarded at trial or on appeal.”86
In 1987, citizens voted to amend the Texas Constitution, expanding
the definition of  public use to encompass “expenditures for economic
development.”87 Previously, the Texas Constitution forbade using the
state’s public funds for private entities, and opponents of the amend-
ment claimed that “taxpayers’ money [should not be given] to private
interests.”88 The supporters of the amendment, however, won the ma-
jority vote, and the amended Texas Constitution now states that “the
legislature may provide for the creation of programs. . . for the public
purposes of development and diversification of the economy of the
state . . . or the development or expansion of transportation or com-
merce in the state.”89 The Texas Constitution placed a limit on the
Legislature’s power by requiring a majority voter approval of the reg-
istered votes within the county or political subdivision voting on the
matter.90 The 1987 amendment paved the way for successive legisla-
tive enactments permitting economic development that was in relation
to a public use.91
B. Senate Bill 7
The Kelo decision struck a nerve with private landowners through-
out the country, many of whom argue that an individual’s land re-
mains as his “castle” to fully enjoy and use without government
interference for arguably indirect reasons.92 In response, the Texas
Legislature enacted a series of statutes, with the judiciary’s support,
that prohibited an authorized entity from taking private land for the
85. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d at 773 (citing Hubenak v. San Jacinto Gas Transmis-
sion Co., 141 S.W.3d 172, 179 (Tex. 2004)).
86. Id. (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.021(a) (West 2014).
87. See Askew, supra note 42, at 538; see also TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52-a.
88. House Research Organization, Special Legislative Report No. 138, at 15 (Aug.
17, 1987), https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/Constitutional_Amendments/Amendments70_
HRO_1987-11-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A9C-LFXC].
89. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52-a.
90. See id.
91. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 380.001 (West 2006) (stating various ways
in which the government can provide economic development); see also Askew, supra
note 42, at 538.
92. See Richard A. Epstein, Kelo v. City of New London Ten Years Later, NAT’L
REV. (June 23, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420144/kelo-v-
city-new-london-ten-years-later-richard-epstein [https://perma.cc/TS8D-XPQQ].
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purpose of economic development when it is not related to the pub-
lic’s use.93
Immediately in 2005—the same year that the Kelo decision was
handed down—the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 7, which pro-
posed an amendment to the Texas Government Code that would pro-
vide limitations on land takings using eminent domain.94 The
proposed statute defined which entities would be subject to Texas’s
eminent domain laws, limited the permissible takings of private prop-
erty, and clarified which entities would be authorized by law to con-
demn private property.95 But, the proposed statute—section 2206.001
of the Texas Government Code—created an exception for “any voter
approved sports and entertainment facility.”96
C. Section 2206.001 of the Texas Government Code: Limitation on
Eminent Domain for Private Parties or Economic
Development Purposes
In 2005, the Texas Legislature enacted Senate Bill 7 into law as sec-
tion 2206.001 of the Texas Government Code.97 This statute limits
land takings by the following entities: “(1) state agenc[ies], including
an institution of higher education as defined by [s]ection 61.003 [of the
Texas] Education Code; (2) a political subdivision of this state; or (3) a
corporation created by a governmental entity to act on behalf of the
entity.”98
In 2016, the Texas Legislature added another prohibition on author-
ized entities, expanding the provision to the following four prohibi-
tions on land takings under eminent domain: (1) takings that provide
a private benefit; (2) takings that provide a public use that is “merely
a pretext to confer a private benefit;” (3) takings for “economic devel-
opment purposes, unless the economic development is a secondary
purpose resulting from municipal community development or munici-
pal urban renewal activities to eliminate an existing affirmative harm
93. See TEX. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (West Supp. 2018); TEX. LOC. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 251.001 (West 2016); TEX. CONST. art. III, § 52-a; City of Austin v.
Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 790–91 (Tex. 2012); Askew, supra note 42, at 541.
94. Act of Sept. 1, 2005, 79th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 1, § 1, sec. 2206.001, 2005 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1 (current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2206.001).
95. See id.
96. Cristin F. Hartzog, Note, The “Public Use” of Private Sports Stadiums: Kelo
Hits A Homerun for Private Developers, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 145, 168 (2006).
97. TEX. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (West Supp. 2018).
98. § 2206.001(a).
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on society from . . . blighted areas,”99 and (4) takings that are not for
the public’s use.100
As proposed in Senate Bill 7, the statute specifically permits emi-
nent domain takings by legally authorized entities when “a sports and
community venue project [is] approved by voters at an election held
on or before December 1, 2005, under Chapter 334 or 335, Local Gov-
ernment Code.”101 Consequentially, this provision is precisely what al-
lowed for the building of the Dallas Cowboys Stadium in Arlington,
Texas, under the state’s eminent domain powers.102
D. Right of Eminent Domain Statute
Previously, section 251.001 of the Texas Government Code used the
phrase “public purpose.”103 In response to Kelo, however, in 2011 the
Texas Legislature enacted a new version of the statute that replaced
“public purpose” with “public use.”104 Section 251.001 of the Texas
Local Government Code sets guidelines for eminent domain power,
stating that “[w]hen the governing body of a municipality considers it
necessary . . . the municipality may exercise the right of eminent do-
main for a public use to acquire public or private property, whether
located inside or outside the municipality.”105 Further, the statute lists
various examples of takings for a “public use,” such as for “providing,
enlarging, or improving of a municipally owned city hall[,] . . .
school[,] or other educational facility.”106
E. Texas Supreme Court
The Texas Supreme Court has held that an individual’s property
may not be condemned under eminent domain unless its purpose is
for a public use.107 The Court has defined “public use” as “when the
99. See TEX. GOVT. CODE ANN. § 2206.001(b)(3) (West Supp. 2018) (takings for
slum or blighted areas under: (A) Chapter 373 or 374, Local Government Code, other
than an activity described by Section 373.002(b)(5), Local Government Code; or Sec-
tion 311.005(a)(1)(I), Tax Code).
100. § 2206.001(b). Takings from slum or blighted areas are limited to activities
arising “under: (A) Chapter 373 or 374, Local Government Code, other than an activ-
ity described by Section 373.002(b)(5), Local Government Code; or (B) Section
311.005(a)(1)(I), Tax Code.” GOV’T § 2206.001(b)(3).
101. § 2206.001(c)(6).
102. See infra Section V.
103. Act of Sept. 1, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 81, § 3, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 81 (cur-
rent version at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 251.001(a)).
104. Id.
105. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 251.001(a) (West 2016).
106. Id.
107. Borden v. Trespalacios Rice & Irrigation Co., 86 S.W. 11, 14 (Tex. 1905), aff’d,
204 U.S. 667 (1907).
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public obtains some definite right or use in the undertaking to which
the property was devoted.”108
The Texas Supreme Court has emphasized deference to the Legisla-
ture in declaring the confines of a public use, except for circumstances
in which the use is “manifestly wrong or unreasonable,” or it is for the
benefit of a private entity.109 When the issue is whether an eminent
domain proceeding was committed through “fraud, bad faith, [or] . . .
arbitrariness and capriciousness,” then this question is usually a ques-
tion of law for the court.110 A jury should hear the case only if dis-
puted facts arise.111
Additionally, furthering the development of “public use” jurispru-
dence in Texas is the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Austin v.
Whittington. Here, the Texas Supreme Court held that the taking of
private property to build a parking garage remained permissible be-
cause the taking for a “public building” did not violate section
2206.001(b)(3) of the Texas Government Code, which prohibits the
use of eminent domain power for economic development purposes
unless the economic development is related to a public purpose.112
The Court reasoned that because the parking garage would be open to
the public and “the primary purpose of the garage is to support the
expanded convention center,” the City’s purpose for the takings con-
stituted a public use.113
V. PUBLIC USE ARGUMENTS: COLLEGE AND PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS STADIUMS IN TEXAS
Land takings for the specific purpose of building sports stadiums
under eminent domain have become a highly litigated topic in Texas.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided on the specific issue of
whether a land taking for the purpose of building a sports stadium
constitutes a “public use” under the Kelo standard.114 However, Jus-
tice O’Connor listed “stadiums” under the second type of eminent do-
main—transferring private property to private parties.115 In For The
108. City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 779 (Tex. 2012) (citing Coastal
States Gas Producing Co. v. Pate, 309 S.W.2d 828, 833 (Tex. 1958); see also Hous.
Auth. of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79, 84 (Tex. 1940) (“It is immaterial if
the use is limited to the citizens of a local neighborhood, or that the number of citi-
zens likely to avail themselves of it is inconsiderable, so long as it is open to all who
choose to avail themselves of it.” (quoting West v. Whitehead, 238 S.W. 976, 978 (Tex.
Civ. App.—San Antonio 1922, writ ref’d)).
109. See Askew, supra note 42, at 540.
110. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d at 777.
111. See id. at 778.
112. Id. at 790–91.
113. Id. at 791.
114. Tyson E. Hubbard, Note, For the Public’s Use? Eminent Domain in Stadium
Construction, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 173, 177 (2008).
115. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 498 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissent-
ing); Hubbard, supra note 114.
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Public’s Use? Eminent Domain in Stadium Construction, Tyson Hub-
bard analogized sports teams to the business of railroads.116 He com-
pared the railroads’ power to assert eminent domain when they “lay
tracks and then charge the public for access to their trains,” to sports
teams’ power to assert eminent domain when they “build stadiums
and then charge the public for access to their venue.”117
Consequentially, contentious litigation has broken out in state
courts to determine whether the taking of private property for build-
ing a sports stadium is a public use.118 The analysis here will evaluate
the prominent arguments for and against whether land takings for the
purpose of building college and professional stadiums are truly for the
public’s use.
A. College Stadiums
Texas law permits the taking of privately-owned land for the con-
struction of college stadiums. A university’s board of regents has emi-
nent domain powers; however, individual homeowners would disagree
that college sports stadiums truly constitute a public use.119
The eminent domain rules for primary and secondary school dis-
tricts are clear and codified in Section 11.55 of the Texas Education
Code which states that “an independent school district may, by exer-
cising the right of eminent domain, acquire the fee simple title to real
property on which to construct school buildings or for any other pub-
lic use necessary for the district.”120 Furthermore, when one of the
state’s political subdivisions begins eminent domain proceedings, the
district court has the authority to decide any issue—such as the au-
thority to take property under eminent domain and the calculation of
damages—that may arise.121
In the realm of Texas public higher education, however, a higher
education entity does not possess any eminent domain powers it-
self.122 But, the Texas Education Code permits a higher education en-
tity’s board of regents, such as the Texas A&M Board of Regents, to
take any property that “the board considers necessary and proper to
carry out its powers and duties” in accordance with the Texas Property
116. Hubbard, supra note 114.
117. Id.
118. See ESPN, supra note 19.
119. See Archer, supra note 40, at 840.
120. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 11.155(a) (West 2013).
121. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.003 (West 2013); Circle X Land & Cattle Co.,
Ltd. v. Mumford Indep. Sch. Dist., 325 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2010, pet. denied).
122. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 53.32 (West 2013); see also § 61.003(8) (Defining
higher education entities as “any public technical institute, public junior college, pub-
lic senior college or university, medical or dental unit, public state college, or other
agency of higher education as defined in this section.”).
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Code.123 For example, in 2017, a university’s board of regents took
private property to build academic buildings.124 This example of a
condemnation provides a benefit to the public because an academic
building may be utilized by citizens, such as for dental care.125 How-
ever, a university’s condemnation of a residential neighborhood in or-
der to build a football stadium tends to raise eyebrows as to whether
the taking truly provides a public benefit.
A university’s land takings for the construction of college stadiums
call into question whether the taking would benefit the public outside
of its direct benefits for the university and its neighboring communi-
ties. In her article Restricting Kelo: Will Redefining “Blight” in Senate
Bill 7 Be the Light at the End of the Tunnel?, Adrianne Archer argues
that cities profit from revenue and tax benefits that are produced from
a university and the bordering property.126 Furthermore, various sta-
diums have been utilized by the public for high school sporting events.
For example, McLane Stadium at Baylor University hosted the Uni-
versity Interscholastic League (“UIL”) state football quarter-finals.127
Finally, college stadiums in Texas promote civic pride in the city’s
home team that translates into new property developments and res-
taurants in the stadium’s surrounding area.128
In contrast, landowners have raised the argument that stadium
projects could increase property taxes as a direct result of the loca-
tion.129 Residential landowners may not want to, or cannot afford to,
pay a higher property tax merely to build a college sports stadium. A
123. § 85.32; see also Archer, supra note 40, at 840–41.
124. Robert Wilonsky, A Real Kick in the Teeth as Texas A&M Takes the Elbow
Room to Make Room for a Dental College, DALLAS NEWS (Apr. 4, 2017), https://www
.dallasnews.com/opinion/commentary/2017/04/04/real-kick-teeth-texas-am-takes-el
bow-room-make-room-dental-college [https://perma.cc/7TYT-XQF8]; Caroline
North, Death of a Dive Bar: Elbow Room Is Officially Rubble, DALLAS OBSERVER




126. Archer, supra note 40, at 839–40.
127. 2017 Football Conference 6A D2, MAXPREPS, http://www.maxpreps.com/tour-
nament/5lQ-21gcEeeT-Oz0u-e-FA/7EyHIlgcEeeT-Oz0u-e-FA/football-fall-17/2017-
uil-football-state-championships-2017-football-conference-6a-d2.htm [https://perma
.cc/ANA3-M38S] (click on Show Details of W5 Carrol v. W8 Midway); see also Jason
Orts, New View for the Red & Blue: Midway Unveils Football Stadium, WACO TRIB.-
HERALD (Aug. 25, 2010) (Midway utilized Baylor University’s previous football sta-




128. Cindy V. Culp, East Waco Neighborhood Watchful as New Baylor Football
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university’s board of regents may rely upon the city and major donors
to build these stadiums;130 however, recent changes to federal tax law
may affect sports donations in the near future.131
In December 2017, both the U.S. Senate and House passed a tax bill
that no longer allows athletic donations as charitable contributions
and as a result, sports stadium donors will be prohibited from writing
off this expense as a portion of their tax deductibles.132 Residential
landowners would argue that if the university cannot properly fund its
stadium project, then the landowners should not have to endure the
burden of increased property taxes. Finally, residential landowners
have argued that the traffic and parking problems that coincide with
the hustle and bustle of game day are a nuisance to the
neighborhood.133
B. Professional Stadiums
In order to justify professional stadium projects under the Kelo
analysis, Cristin F. Hartzong argues in The “Public Use” of Private
Sports Stadiums: Kelo Hits A Homerun for Private Developers that
these stadiums which obtain at minimum partial private funding, if not
entirely privately-owned, must use the economic development argu-
ment to justify its takings.134 Thus, if building a professional sports
stadium is “rationally related to such an economic plan” rather than
“[a mere] pretext of a public purpose,” then the professional stadium
passes the public use test under eminent domain.135
Property rights advocates would argue that professional sports
teams are privately owned by individuals and do not provide a public
use that is rationally related to an economic development plan.136
Thus, the argument could be made that a private/public partnership is
a way for professional sports teams to exploit a city without really
creating any tangible benefit from revenue or jobs. For example, with
the Dallas Cowboys project in Arlington, “[s]ome people were philo-
sophically opposed to the private/public partnership and thought that
the Cowboys should spend their own money to build the stadium
without public financial support.”137 A great number of professional
130. See Brad Wolverton & Sandhya Kambhampati, Colleges Raised $1.2 Billion in
Donations for Sports in 2015, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www
.chronicle.com/article/Colleges-Raised-12-Billion/235058 [https://perma.cc/HP82-UV
MN].




133. Culp, supra note 128.
134. Hartzog, supra note 96, at 156–57.
135. Id. at 158.
136. See id.
137. Wall & Nimocks, supra note 15, at 5.
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stadiums, however, provide an avenue toward the respective cities’ ec-
onomic development by transforming its depressed and blighted
regions.138
Additionally, landowners who value their homes as their “castle”
would argue that professional teams are essentially producing a profit
for the owner rather than providing a benefit to the public. The team’s
owner would counter that the stadium is made available to the public.
But, are these tickets really available to the general population when
it costs an average of $110.20 for attending a game for the Cowboys at
AT&T Stadium?139 Additionally, CNBC states that the total cost for
attending a Cowboys game—which includes the price for beer, soda,
hot dog, and parking—is $333.40.140
Further, no evidence exists that “the level or the growth rate of real
per capita personal income is enhanced by construction of a sports
arena or stadium.”141 When polled, 83% of economists believed that
“[p]roviding state and local subsidies to build stadiums for profes-
sional sports teams is likely to cost the relevant taxpayers more money
than any local economic benefits that are generated.”142 Economic
growth is contingent upon the development of the “physical and
human capital stocks and on technological change.”143 Thus, the
causal connection between a sports environment and these constructs
is questionable.144
Instead, governments could allot the public’s tax money toward the
more worthwhile expenses, such as “local infrastructure, public safety,
education, and other forms of economic development.”145 Wolla
stated in his article The Economics of Subsidizing Sports Stadiums
that infrastructure could “increase productivity because it reduces the
cost (in time and money) of transporting goods and people from one
place to another,” and education buildings produce “human capital
investment” by facilitating a place for students to obtain the requisite
knowledge and skills for their future jobs.146
138. Hubbard, supra note 114, at 175.
139. Emmie Martin, The 10 Most Expensive NFL Teams to Watch Live, CNBC
(Sept. 10, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/08/most-expensive-nfl-
teams-games-to-attend.html [https://perma.cc/EH3P-5BM8].
140. Id.
141. Hartzog, supra note 96, at 159 (quoting Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys,
The Growth Effects of Sports Franchises, Stadia, and Arenas, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 601, 622 (1999)).
142. Scott A. Wolla, The Economics of Subsidizing Sports Stadiums, PAGE ONE
ECON. (May 2017), https://files.stlouisfed.org/files/htdocs/publications/page1-econ/
2017-05-01/the-economics-of-subsidizing-sports-stadiums_SE.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9
ZU-MPN5].
143. Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, The Growth Effects of Sports
Franchises, Stadia, and Arenas, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 601, 622 (1999).
144. Id.
145. See Hartzog, supra note 96, at 159.
146. Wolla, supra note 142, at 2–3 (citing Miller, Matt & Bullard, James, Bullard:
Infrastructure Plan Could Boost Productivity, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2016, 8:11 AM)
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As an example of promoting education subsidies, a member of the
Cincinnati city government opposed his city’s initiative to build a new
sports stadium by arguing for the sales tax to go towards the city’s
poor, bankrupt schools that were in dire need of the city’s funding.147
He argued that the business executives who pushed for these new sta-
diums are not the ones sending their children to the public schools,
and the city’s priority should be focused on improving its school sys-
tems first and recreational sports stadiums later.148 Weinberg argued
in Eminent Domain For Private Sports Stadiums: Fair Ball or Foul?
that “[t]he support for this profligate subsidization when public
schools, mass transit, and public health are in desperate need of mu-
nicipal funds derives in large measure from the milking of sports fans’
emotions and civic pride.”149
In contrast, proponents for sports stadiums as a public use would
argue that professional sports stadiums are a commodity that not only
generate revenue for the state and individual cities, but they also cre-
ate common bonds among the community that unite citizens behind
supporting the home team. Generally, sports stadiums create an envi-
ronment for fans to come together. For example, Eckstein and Dela-
ney state in their article that stadium supporters use noneconomic
justifications to argue in favor of building professional sports stadi-
ums, and the non-economic benefits are “community self-esteem” and
“community collective conscience.”150 Internal community self-esteem
persuades residents to build new stadiums in order to avoid losing its
status as an individual city, and external community self-esteem con-
vinces residents that new amenities and national prominence will re-
sult from a new professional sports stadium.151 Community collective
conscience signifies “shared values, beliefs, and experiences that bind
community members to one another.”152
The authors found through a study of ten cities across the nation
that are building new sports stadiums that the arguments of commu-
nity self-esteem and community collective conscience seem most ap-
plicable to “smaller cities, newly emerging cities (in the South and
West), and those cities that have suffered serious population de-
cline.”153 Internal community self-esteem motivates the residents of
these cities to prevent another city from taking over and prevents the
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2016-11-18/bullard-infrastructure-plan-could-
boost-productivity [https://perma.cc/RL52-LA8R].).
147. Rick Eckstein & Kevin Delaney, New Sports Stadiums, Community Self-Es-
teem, and Community Collective Conscience, 26 J. OF SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 235,
241–42 (2002).
148. Id.
149. Weinberg, supra note 48, at 320.
150. Eckstein & Delaney, supra note 147, at 236.
151. Id. at 238.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 243.
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city from becoming less prominent within the state or country.154 Fur-
ther, their findings indicate that appeals to the residents by targeting
community self-esteem and community collective conscience could be
more effective than appeals stating economic benefits.155
Another public benefit of the new stadiums is increased employ-
ment opportunities. Sports stadium projects have the ability to create
new construction jobs during a stadium’s building phase.156 When the
stadium construction is complete, stadium projects create new jobs in
ticket sales, parking, concessions, and other game-day staff posi-
tions.157 Then, the money that parking attendants, restaurant workers,
and stadium workers spend from their income will circulate through-
out the local economy.158 This example is what economists call the
multiplier effect, which means that “one dollar of spending (by con-
sumers, businesses, or government) creates more than one dollar in
economic activity.”159 In 2015, the economic impact of millions at-
tending St. Louis Cardinal home games was $343.9 million.160 Thus, a
new sports stadium can generate a worthwhile economic impact that
gives back to the local people whose increased taxes paid for the
project.
Economists also do not consider the prospect of “opportunity costs”
in building sports stadiums. An opportunity cost is “the value of the
next-best alternative when a decision is made.”161 In the realm of
sports stadiums, economists must weigh the “seen” and “unseen” con-
sumer expenses.162 The consumer’s “seen” expenses are spent while
attending a sporting event, and the money a consumer would expend
otherwise is the “unseen” expenses.163 Wolla asserted in his article
that “[i]f [consumers] were not spending on sporting events, they
would instead spend on museums, movies, concerts, theater, restau-
rants, and so on.”164 Thus, the consumer money expended at new
sports stadiums would be “diverted spending” rather than “new
spending.”165
Not only do professional stadiums create an economic impact, but
they also provide shelter for victims of hurricanes and natural disas-
ters, such as the Toyota Center in Houston, Texas, that provided shel-
ter to victims in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey.166 Professional
154. Id.
155. See id. at 245–46.
156. Wolla, supra note 142, at 1.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 2.
160. Id. at 1.





166. Fedschun & Brown, supra note 26.
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sports stadiums also provide a location for local high school teams to
play football games. For example, in 2017, AT&T Stadium in Arling-
ton hosted the UIL high school state title games for each division for a
reduced price of $15 per ticket.167 These reduced prices allowed peo-
ple who may not be able to afford a Cowboys ticket the chance of
experiencing AT&T Stadium. Jones himself dreamed of AT&T Sta-
dium not only being the home field for the Cowboys but to be a venue
utilized for multiple purposes including high school football games.168
The stadium has hosted a number of events, such as “Super Bowl XLV
. . . the NBA All-Star Game, NCAA Men’s Final Four, NCAA Wo-
men’s Final Four, CONCACAF soccer, concerts, rodeos, motocross
and even the ultra-popular Wrestlemania.”169 As evidenced in the vast
scope of events hosted in this stadium, AT&T is noticeably much
more than simply a football stadium.170
Additionally, as interest in the location of sports stadiums develop,
“the value of existing commercial and residential property is likely to
improve”171, and new retail and commercial facilities may pop up in
these growing areas. A concrete example of a sports team owner’s
partnership with a city and school district is “The Star” in Frisco,
Texas.172 Together, Jerry Jones and the City of Frisco, built “The
Star,” which serves as the Cowboy’s headquarters and a “mixed use
development.”173 The Star’s prominence in Frisco has resulted in a
boom of retail development with plans for an Omni Frisco Hotel and
Baylor Scott & White Sports Therapy & Research facility.174 Thus, the
establishment of this professional sports facility will now result in
higher revenues in tourism for the City of Frisco, a new hotel for visi-
tors, and a sports therapy center to serve the team and the public.175
C. Case Studies
The following case studies of Texas A&M University, Baylor Uni-
versity, and the Dallas Cowboys further evaluate sports stadium con-
demnations as a public use.
167. UIL Football Championship Schedule, STATESMAN, https://www.statesman
.com/NEWS/20171217/UIL-football-championship-schedule [https://perma.cc/76D6-
KN9U] (last visited Feb. 7, 2019); Michael Florek, UIL Football State Championships
to Remain at AT&T Stadium in 2018, 2019, SPORTSDAY HS (May 9) https://sports
day.dallasnews.com/high-school/high-schools/2018/05/09/uil-football-state-champion
ships-remain-att-stadium-2018-2019 [https://perma.cc/8TZ2-FGNU] (Cowboys Sta-
dium has held the UIL state championships from 2011 to 2014 and 2016 to 2017.
Further, Cowboys Stadium will hold the championship game in 2018 and 2019.).
168. See Humphrey, supra note 23.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Wolla, supra note 142, at 2.
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1. Texas A&M University
First, in 2001, the Texas Legislature enacted section 85.32 of the
Texas Education Code providing that the Texas A&M University Sys-
tem board may “exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire real
property the board considers necessary and proper to carry out its
powers and duties.”176 Further, the statute limits the board’s actions to
“exercis[ing] the power of eminent domain in the manner prescribed
by Chapter 21, Property Code . . . .”177 In 2016, for example, Texas
A&M University’s Board of Regents approved the condemnation of
The Elbow Room, a Dallas landmark bar, in order to build its new
College of Dentistry.178 Preservation Dallas, a non-profit organiza-
tion, and the Texas Landmark Commission attempted to make the El-
bow Room a historic landmark, but the City of Dallas already granted
demolition permits before they could make this designation.179 The
new dental school will increase the Texas A&M College of Dentistry’s
enrollment by 25% and it will provide the Dallas/Fort Worth me-
troplex another option for dental care.180
2. Baylor University
Second, unlike public universities, private higher education institu-
tions are not permitted to use eminent domain in order to take
land.181 These institutions may however push for rezoning districts in
order to allow the city to take land under the category of a blighted
region. Beginning in 2011, Baylor University built its new football sta-
dium, McLane Stadium, on the banks of the Brazos River and along
the I-35 corridor.182 “The stadium, along with the frontage road
bridges [and] the new Umphrey pedestrian bridge . . . have reshaped
the front door to Baylor and downtown Waco.”183 Mega-donor Dray-
ton McLane believed that the stadium project would enhance Waco
and Baylor through the development of new hotels, restaurants, and
entertainment.184
176. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 85.32(a) (West 2002).
177. EDUC. § 85.32(b).
178. Wilonsky, supra note 124.
179. North, supra note 124.
180. Candace Carlisle, Texas A&M to Begin $127M Building in Deep Ellum to
Boost Dallas Enrollment, DALLAS BUS. J., (Oct. 18, 2017, 3:27 P.M.), https://www.biz
journals.com/dallas/news/2017/10/18/texas-a-m-to-begin-129m-building-in-deep-ell
um-to.html [https://perma.cc/K5C7-YHJ2].
181. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 53A.32 (West 2013).
182. Culp, supra note 128.
183. J.B. Smith, Stadium Rising: The Story of McLane Stadium, From Start to Fin-
ish, WACO TRIB. (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.wacotrib.com/sports/baylor/baylor_sta
dium/stadium-rising-the-story-of-mclane-stadium-from-start-to/article_d9e6a3c6-1f87-
5fc9-8c1b-99ae1a8c8bf5.html [https://perma.cc/EWT9-PSNU].
184. Cindy V. Culp, McLane Pledges Large Donation to Baylor for On-Campus
Football Stadium, WACO TRIB. (Mar. 14, 2012) https://www.wacotrib.com/news/mc
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With the new stadium project underway, nearby neighborhoods be-
came worried that Baylor would need more land for parking around
the stadium, and as a result, the neighbors organized the Olive
Heights Association to fight off the looming threat of losing their
homes.185 “The worry is that if a number of lots are purchased by peo-
ple who [do not] live in the area, that could change the atmosphere of
the neighborhood.”186
3. Dallas Cowboys
Finally, in 2009, Jerry Jones built a $1.2 billion stadium in Arlington,
Texas, that is affectionately known as “Jerry World.”187 Several years
prior in 2004, however, the proposition authorizing construction of
Cowboys Stadium almost failed due to lack of support among Arling-
ton residents.188 Consequentially, the Mayor of Arlington, along with
representatives of the Dallas Cowboys, generated sufficient support
through advertisements and presentations throughout the city.189 Dal-
las Cowboys Director of Client Services and Corporate Communica-
tions Brett Daniels stated, “[w]e had to get our message across that
Cowboys Stadium would put North Texas on the global map [sic] and
create an economic engine for the business community and the citi-
zens of Arlington.”190
Together Jerry Jones and the City updated residents on the sta-
dium’s progress with encouraging letters from the Mayor, City Man-
ager, and other city officials stating that construction of the stadium
would result in national entertainment prestige for Arlington with
“opportunities such as the NBA All-Star game and Super Bowl SLV”
and in tax benefits for “Arlington and North Texas residents.”191 Their
hard work paid off and 58% of voters approved the proposition.192
In 2007, the City of Arlington settled what might have become the
“first Dallas Cowboys stadium eminent domain case” to make it to
trial.193 After the City took landowners’ homes through the use of em-
inent domain needed for the new Dallas Cowboys stadium, residents
responded with lawsuits challenging the amount of money they re-
ceived in exchange for their place of dwelling.194 “The city withdrew
[ten] eminent domain cases, and five lawsuits have been settled since
lane-pledges-large-donation-to-baylor-for-on-campus-football/article_595c9911-75a1-
57ef-8c88-0c7f5b2903f7.html [https://perma.cc/GJ73-6YTM].
185. Culp, supra note 128.
186. Id.
187. Humphrey, supra note 23.
188. Wall & Nimocks, supra note 15, at 8.




193. ESPN, supra note 19.
194. See id.
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the fall. One is pending in state district court, and [seventy-five] are
pending in Tarrant County Court.”195 For example, landowner Johnny
Johnson lived in his home for sixteen years before the city took his
land toward the end of 2005.196 Johnson claimed that his home ap-
praised out to $106,000 at market value, but the city merely offered
$75,000 for Johnson’s home and land.197 “The Tarrant Appraisal Dis-
trict had valued the property at $24,000 for taxing purposes.”198
Before the case went to trial, the parties settled at $100,000.199
Even though a stadium may provide many benefits for its home
city, the issue remains—in college sports stadiums as well—whether a
city’s benefit of growth and economic development translates to the
public obtaining a benefit. In evaluating both sides of the public ver-
sus private use debate, college and professional sports stadiums pro-
vide a public use to citizens because sports stadiums provide access to
public participation, national prominence, revenue, tax benefits, and
even act as hurricane shelters for its citizens. The totality of these op-
portunities for citizens to obtain access to the stadium, along with the
stadium’s benefits to the city, outweigh the argument of sports stadi-
ums as a private use. When the purpose for the land taking is for
building a sports stadium, however, a higher threshold for the amount
of compensation would provide additional protections for private
landowners who fear sports stadium condemnations.200
VI. PROPOSAL FOR A LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT TO SECTION
2206.001(C) OF THE TEXAS GOVERNMENT CODE
Eminent domain is here to stay because of the development and
revenue it provides. Where does this leave residential landowners?
Frequently, they are not fully compensated when their homes are
taken for a sports stadium. The judicial system is too costly and taxing
upon individuals, and thereafter, will offer little relief. An amendment
to section 2206.001(c) of the Texas Government Code—which pro-
vides the exception for an authorized entity’s condemnation of “a
sports and community venue project approved by voters at an election
held on or before December 1, 2005, under Chapter 334 or 335, Local
Government Code”201—is likely the best method to further protect
private citizens’ home values.
Analyzing other states’ judiciary holdings and guidelines is useful in
understanding how to provide appropriate protections to landowners






200. See infra Section VI.
201. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(c)(6) (West 2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR311.txt unknown Seq: 25 15-APR-19 14:47
2019] EMINENT DOMAIN A DECADE AFTER KELO 1125
a new source of revenue and employment opportunities in under-de-
veloped regions. In 1981, the Supreme Court of Michigan in Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit held that the City’s takings to
build an assembly plant for General Motors constituted a public
use.202 The Court reasoned that even though the land takings would
benefit the corporation, an increase in Detroit’s employment opportu-
nities would also meet the public use requirement.203
However, in 1988 the Michigan Supreme Court in City of Wayne
County v. Hathcock overturned the controversial standard in
Poletown.204 The Court turned to the state constitution’s public use
standard that emulated the Fifth Amendment.205 The Court’s final
conclusion reasoned that even though the public would benefit from
employment opportunities, “the underlying purposes for resorting to
condemnation, rather than the subsequent use of condemned land,
must satisfy the Constitution’s public use requirement.”206 Since the
“gains to private parties outweighed the public benefits,” the Court
held that the land taking did not provide a public use.207
Additionally, in Schreiner v. City of Spokane, the Court of Appeals
of Washington, Division III held that a land taking under the doctrine
of eminent domain in order to build a “multi-purpose facility” utilized
for “sports and entertainment” established a constitutional condemna-
tion.208 Similar to the ASFDA, the City of Spokane formed Spokane
PFD to examine the financial capacity to build “a new multi-purpose
community center and to finance, construct[,] and ultimately own and
operate the facility.”209 Section 35.59.050 of the Revised Code of
Washington Annotated permits Spokane PFD to take land for “a
sports and entertainment facility ‘by lease, sublease, purchase, or
sale,’” and the statute explicitly states that the achievement of this
land taking “is declared to be a strictly public purpose of the munici-
pality . . . .”210 The court reasoned that the construction of a multi-
purpose community center and the attainment of a sports and en-
tertainment arena under eminent domain embody a similar idea—the
“provision of a facility for civic entertainment, cultural and educa-
tional events.”211
Cities across the country own professional football stadiums and al-
low National Football League teams to utilize the space on game
202. See Weinberg, supra note 48, at 316 (citing Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981)).
203. See id.
204. See id.; Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004).
205. See Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d at 786–87.
206. Id. at 783.
207. Weinberg, supra note 48, at 316.
208. See Schreiner v. City of Spokane, 874 P.2d 883, 887–88 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
209. Id. at 887.
210. Id.; WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 35.59.050 (West 2016).
211. Schreiner, 874 P.2d at 888.
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day.212 For example, the City of Baltimore owns Camden Yards Sta-
dium, while the Baltimore Ravens do not pay rent to play there but
retain half of the revenue from non-football events held in the sta-
dium.213 The Congressional Research Service assessed that for every
new employment position created by the new stadium project, taxpay-
ers spent $127,000–$331,000. Nevertheless, Camden Yards Stadium
was deemed as an “integral part of Baltimore’s renaissance” in the
Inner Harbor, which is the city’s most popular tourist district.214
Additionally, cities have used a referendum to vote on the decision
to build a professional sports stadium.215 In Eminent Domain for Pri-
vate Sports Stadiums: Fair Ball or Foul?, Weinberg argued that this
practice “allows politicians to wash their hands of the situation” by
leaving the decision to the voters.216 However, referendums consume
public funds in different ways when cities spend months and
thousands of dollars on advertising the benefits of building a sta-
dium.217 Citizen voters are given fair notice and an opportunity to
vote on keeping a professional team, which in turn would raise the
property taxes. Thus, proponents of a city-wide vote would argue that
residents who oppose funding a professional football team should sim-
ply vote against the measure.
Texas statutes provide similar opportunities for cities to use eminent
domain power to build sports stadiums while maintaining some pro-
tections for landowners by including four limitations on land tak-
ings.218 Like the Michigan Constitution, Texas’s statute emphasizes
the importance of evaluating the underlying purpose of condemnation
in determining whether a taking is constitutional. The four statutory
limitations on takings219 aim to restrict needless condemnations that
fail constitutional muster. However, like section 35.59.050 of the Re-
vised Code of Washington Annotated that permits entities to build
“sports and entertainment facilit[ies],”220 section 2206.001(c) of the
Texas Government Code allows authorized entities using eminent do-
main to build sports and community venue projects with voter
approval.221
Essentially, the Texas Legislature limited the Kelo holding by enact-
ing limitations on an authorized entity’s condemnations, but also pro-
212. See Weinberg, supra note 48, at 320–21.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. Michael Farren & Thomas Savidge, A Win for San Diego, Voters Wisely Re-
jected Paying for a New Stadium for the NFL’s Chargers., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Nov. 14, 2016, 10:45 A.M.), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-11-14/san-
diego-voters-wisely-reject-new-chargers-stadium.
216. See Weinberg, supra note 48, at 322.
217. See Wall & Nimocks, supra note 15, at 26–30.
218. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (West 2016).
219. GOV’T CODE § 2206.001(b).
220. WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 35.59.050 (West 2016).
221. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001(c)(6) (West 2015)
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vided an avenue for entities to build their sports stadiums under
eminent domain. This carrot-and-stick approach seems to function in
Texas with the Dallas Cowboys Stadium, which is living proof of a
stadium built subsequently to the enactment of section 2206.001 of the
Texas Government Code. Arlington residents approved the one-half
cent sales tax increase,222 and the stadium has provided Arlington
with national prominence and revenue.223 However, one vital issue in
the statute remains in legal contest: whether residential landowners
are fully compensated for the value of their homes. Courts have held
that the landowner should be compensated for the FMV of their
homes.224 But the FMV arguably does not fully compensate the land-
owners’ loss of their rights to use and enjoy their homes.225
For example, if a residential landowner were to sell his or her home
in an arms-length transaction, the landowner would want to sell the
home above the FMV to maximize the landowner’s profits.226 In Law
and Economics, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen argue that mutual
gain is the ideal result that encourages sales, but the result of a taking
under eminent domain is merely a unilateral gain of the authorized
entity.227 The public-use requirement avoids the abuse that a private
landowner would have endured if an entity were allowed to take land
from one private landowner and sell that land to another private
buyer below the landowner’s likely offered price.228 However, the
public-use standard does not completely solve the issue of efficiency in
takings because landowners will likely not be compensated from the
entity at their preferred price, and they would lose out on any poten-
tial profit from a sale of the home.229
For example, suppose that the City of Arlington took Johnny’s land
under eminent domain in order to build the Dallas Cowboys Stadium.
Suppose that the City expected to pay $11 million in order to build the
stadium, and the FMV of Johnny’s home was $130,000. If Johnny’s
house is subjectively valued at $250,000, then Johnny would lose
$120,000 that he potentially could have gained from selling his home.
As Jon Fee stated in his article Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of
Home, a residential taking should provide the compensation that
would “make the owner indifferent to the land acquisition at issue
(not indifferent to the government’s choice to use eminent domain as
the means of acquisition), accounting for the owner’s reasonable sub-
222. Wall & Nimocks, supra note 15, at 7–9.
223. See Greene, supra note 7.
224. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 176 (Berkeley Law






229. See Id. at 177.
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jective value.”230 Fee also warned against compensating above the
owner’s subjective value because the government should be permitted
to keep the surplus of its building project for itself and for the public’s
benefit.231 However, because the public use in this situation would be
for the building of sports stadiums, rather than more easily accessible
public parks and highways, then the owner’s subjective value should
not be the highest threshold when the taking is for the purpose of
building a sports stadium.
Therefore, the best method to fully compensate the residential land-
owner for losing the right to sell, use, and enjoy the home is to estab-
lish a higher threshold for compensation, such as 150–250% of the
property value, when authorized entities are taking land for the pur-
pose of building “sports and community venue project[s].” For exam-
ple, Indiana enacted a similar provision that would provide
compensation higher than 100% of the FMV.232 As a result, the resi-
dential landowner would be fully compensated for the home’s equity
if the landowner could have sold it in an arms-length transaction.
Unsurprisingly, a higher compensation for the landowner would re-
sult in losses for the city and sports team. Taxpayer money would be
spent here to pay more than the FMV in order to compensate a sub-
jective value that we cannot measure. Additionally, the cost of build-
ing sports stadiums would increase and, therefore, chill the
construction of sports stadiums in Texas.
These ramifications of a higher threshold for landowner compensa-
tion may stand as true, but the issue remains as to how much our
society is willing to take from landowners to build sports stadiums. As
Richard Epstein stated, compensation that “lies between the general
market value and some higher subjective valuation . . . permits the
owner to duplicate the condemned facilities and thus regain [leftover
money] . . . .”233 By compensating the landowner 150–250% of the
FMV, the city would compensate an amount somewhere between the
landowner’s subjective value, which is higher than what the city would
want to pay, and the FMV, which is likely lower than the owner would
want to receive.
Finally, compensation that is greater than FMV and is closer to the
owner’s subjective value would incite the landowner to peacefully give
up the property rather than become a holdout. A primary purpose of
eminent domain is to prevent the landowner from becoming a
230. Fee, supra note 33, at 807.
231. Id. at 808–09.
232. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-24-4.5-8(2)(A) (West 2013) (“Payment to the owner
equal to one hundred fifty percent (150%) of the FMV of the parcel as determined
under IC 32–24–1”).
233. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EM-
INENT DOMAIN 183 (Harvard Univ. Press 1985).
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holdout, which would raise the costs of other tracts of land.234 As fur-
ther incentive to peacefully give up the property, the city could pro-
vide the landowner compensation at 150–250% of the FMV with the
understanding that the landowner would not be permitted to bring
any claims against the city for the compensation price.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Texas Legislature responded to the landmark Kelo holding by
enacting statutes that limited an authorized entity’s ability to condemn
land from private landowners.235 However, the statute provides an ex-
ception that entities may use eminent domain to build sports and com-
munity venue projects.236 Texas’s law for taking land to build sports
stadiums is similar to other states with its use of residential voter ap-
proval to build a stadium. Residential voter approval is an excellent
way to achieve the direct democracy principles that our country was
founded upon.
However, the compensation to residential landowners for the FMV
of their land fails to fully compensate the landowners for the senti-
mental loss of their home and their rights to use, enjoy, and sell their
homes. Therefore, an amendment to section 2206.001 of the Texas
Government Code—providing a higher threshold for landowner com-
pensation, such as 150–250% of the property value, when authorized
entities are taking land to build “sports and community venue pro-
ject[s]”—provides a framework for a university’s board of regents or a
city to fully compensate the landowner.
234. Cooter & Ulen, supra note 224, at 177 (“Even when owners do not hold out,
the possibility of doing so can dramatically increase the transaction costs of purchas-
ing contiguous property.”).
235. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (West 2016); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
ANN. § 251.001 (West 2018).
236. § 2206.001(c)(6).
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